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Abstract: Most postcrisis financial regulation is expressed to be in the pursuit of
increasing the resilience of the global financial system. “Resilience” features in
the formal title of the Basel III reforms to bank capital adequacy rules. This article
explores the meaning of resilience from social-ecological systems science and
applies it to international finance. We conclude that postcrisis financial
regulation has in fact sought to build a stronger, more robust system, not a more
resilient one. The regulation imposed on global systemically important financial
institutions is designed to make these institutions too strong to fail, not give them
the capacity to reorganize themselves, or transition to a new equilibrium, in the
face of major external shocks. This article challenges the fundamental thinking
behind seven years of postcrisis financial regulation and suggests we need far
more rigorous research into what a truly resilient international financial system
would look like and how it would be regulated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Resilience is broadly defined as “the capacity of a system to avoid
disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain
essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.”1 It is a
concept with a multidisciplinary pedigree with roots in ecology, security
analysis and childhood trauma, among others, and which focuses on the
dynamic capacity of a complex, adaptive, nonlinear system to self-repair in
response to stress or to transition to a new stable equilibrium, rather than the
capacity of a system to function without succumbing to crisis in the first
place. It is therefore a useful concept to apply to finance because of the
tendency of the globally integrated financial system to swing from one crisis
to another,2 and it is a term that has come to feature heavily in postcrisis
debates about financial stability.3 In light of the scale of the global financial
crisis of 2008 and the bailouts required to save the system, resilience is seen
as a highly desirable attribute of today’s integrated global markets and an
objective of postcrisis regulatory reforms.
However, as a broad, multidisciplinary concept, it is not unproblematic
in its application to finance because it does not immediately offer a practical,
concrete agenda for reform specific to the financial markets. Resilience, as it
is applied in disciplines like ecology, for example, is generally a descriptive
rather than normative attribute of a system, i.e. undesirable systems can be
characterized as resilient because they also have the capacity to endure in the
face of shocks. To understand resilience, the key structural attributes of a
1 Brian H. Walker, C. S. Holling, Stephen R. Carpenter & Ann Kinzig, Resilience, Adaptability and
Transformability in Social-Ecological Systems, 9(2) ECOL. SOC. 5 (2004).
2 When the crises that have been produced by the financial markets over the last quarter of a century
are listed, it is immediately striking that the periods without crises are by far the rarer creature: Eurozone
crisis (2010–); Global Financial Crisis (2007–2009); Global Food & Fuel Crisis (2005–2008) (although
this is not counted as a financial market crisis proper, it resulted from the global asset boom & increased
trading in agricultural commodities, and it had a very serious impact on the world’s poorest people);
Dotcom Crisis/Argentina (2001–2003); Russia/Latin America (1998–1999); LTCM (1998); Asian
Financial Crisis (1997–1998); Bond Market Crisis (1994); European ERM Crisis (1992–1993); Stock
Market Crash (1987). CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (6th ed. 2011); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S.
ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009); ROSS P. BUCKLEY &
DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY
FAILURE (2011).
3 See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR (2009); BANK
OF ENG., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: BUILDING A MORE RESILIENT FINANCIAL SYSTEM 36–57 (JUNE
2009); FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING MARKET
AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE (Apr., 2008); Mario Draghi, President, European Cent. Bank, Speech at
the 2013 International Monetary Conference: Strengthening Financial Resilience (June 3, 2013),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130603.en.html.
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system and its essential dynamics, interdependencies and feedback loops
need to be mapped. However, the complexity and lack of transparency of
today’s global financial markets make this exceptionally difficult. Where the
term resilience is used in regulatory debates, it often indicates a generally
desired condition of systemic stability which is assumed to flow from the
proposed regulatory measures. It is not generally used to denote a particular
approach to understanding the dynamics of global finance and the required
management/regulatory responses for achieving stability. Thus, resilience is
used in a generic, descriptive manner rather than as the organizing goal of a
new regulatory approach. While there is wide-ranging stakeholder agreement
on the value of increased financial system resilience, resilience does not in
and of itself offer an immediate agenda for reform, and despite the frequent
use of the term in regulatory debate, no one really knows whether the
postcrisis regulatory changes will have this effect.
Our purpose is to review certain key characteristics of resilience as it
has been applied in social-ecological systems science (SES) where the
concept first emerged, and to analyze whether they offer insights into the
better management of financial systems, particularly the global financial
system. Applying SES resilience thinking to finance raises acute questions
around our understanding of financial systems as systems, and their key
dynamics, risk factors and stability determinants; and raises the fundamental
issue of whether we understand the financial system sufficiently well to even
be able to develop a regulatory agenda for resilience.
II. RECOGNIZING RESILIENCE – WILL WE KNOW IT WHEN
WE SEE IT?
One of the problems with applying the concept of resilience to the
international financial system is that it is not clear that we will know it when
we see it. Nor is it self-evident that the concept provides a specific roadmap
for change. Resilience has become a “pervasive idiom of global governance”4
that:
has in the recent past rapidly infiltrated vast areas of the social
sciences, becoming a regular, if under-theorized, term of art in
discussions of international finance and economic policy, corporate
risk analysis, the psychology of trauma, development policy, urban
planning, public health and national security.5

4 Jeremy Walker & Melinda Cooper, Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems Ecology to the
Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation, 42(2) SECURITY DIALOGUE 143, 143 (2011).
5 Id.

4

DOWELL-JONES & BUCKLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

3/6/2017 6:19 PM

Reconceiving Resilience
37:1 (2017)

As should be expected of a concept that can be applied so broadly across
disciplines, its inherent malleability fosters its multidisciplinary uptake, but
the challenges in reconfiguring the international financial architecture mean
it can only provide broad principles of thought.
Perhaps the biggest problem with the concept of resilience is that it can
easily be mistaken for something else. Most commonly, it has been mistaken
for interludes of market calm between crises. It is also called in aid to justify
the apparent success of new financial products, ideas and reforms, before
they have had time to cause harm.
In 2005, the Director of the IMF’s International Capital Markets
Department stated that “For four straight years the global financial system
has shown impressive resilience.”6
In 2005, Alan Greenspan remarked that “[t]he use of a growing array of
derivatives and the related application of more-sophisticated approaches to
measuring and managing risk are key factors underpinning the greater
resilience of our largest financial institutions . . . .”7
In 2006, the IMF asserted that “the dispersion of credit risk by banks to
a broader and more diverse group of investors, rather than warehousing such
risk on their balance sheets, has helped to make the banking and overall
financial system more resilient.”8
In August 2007, the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King
stated:
[I]t is very important to set a very, very key point here, which is that
our banking system is much more resilient than in the past. Precisely
because many of these risks are no longer on their balance sheets but
have been sold off to people willing and probably more able to bear
it.9

One month later, the Bank of England was dealing with the first run on
a British bank in over one hundred years.10
Despite these errors in recognizing resilience, the idea of resilience has
6 Gerd Häusler, Why the Global Financial System is More Resilient, INT’L MONETARY FUND: VIEWS
& COMMENTARIES (Oct. 7, 2005), http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2005/100705e.htm.
7 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks delivered to the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on Bank Structure: Risk Transfer and Financial Stability
(May 5, 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2005/20050505.
8 IMF, Market Developments and Issues, Global Financial Stability Report, at 51 (Apr. 2006).
9 Bank of Eng., Inflation Report Press Conference (Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk
/publications/Documents/inflationreport/conf080807.pdf.
10 Although there had been bank collapses such as Barings in 1995, a run on the retail deposits of a
British bank had not occurred since Victorian times. In 1866, a run on deposits was triggered by the
collapse of Overend, Gurney & Co., and in 1878 by the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank. TREASURY
COMMITTEE, THE RUN ON THE ROCK, 2007-8, HC 56-I, at 8–9 (UK).
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become ubiquitous in regulatory debates. As the Bank of England remarked
in its 2009 Financial Stability Report chapter titled “Building a more resilient
financial system”:
The financial system should be capable of absorbing shocks from the
economy and from financial markets rather than generating them. It
also needs to be much better able to support economic activity on a
sustainable basis, without relying on large-scale publicly funded
support to weather shocks. This will require fundamental changes to
the way the financial sector is regulated, supervised and manages its
own affairs.11

The Basel III international capital adequacy regulations which emerged
out of the crisis are formally titled “A Global Regulatory Framework for
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems,” and their overarching objective
is “to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from
financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of
spillover from the financial sector to the real economy.”12 This conceives of
resilience of the financial system as separate and distinct from the resilience
of the broader economy or society, as if the one can be defined in isolation
from the other. The fact that regulators in various jurisdictions have chosen
to adopt higher capital requirements than those mandated in these regulations
indicates in any case less than full consensus on the framework’s ability to
achieve the desired financial stability and resilience outcomes.13 The Basel
III framework establishes a soft law set of minimum standards for the global
banking system, with national regulators free to go beyond the minimum. In
practice, “most jurisdictions have adopted minimum requirements that
exceed the global standard,” which has been labelled as “superequivalence.”14
11

BANK OF ENG., supra note 3, at 36.
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 1 (2011),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
13 See IMF, Australia: Addressing Systemic Risk Through Higher Loss Absorbency — Technical
Note, at 10 tbl. 4, Country Report No. 12/311 (Nov. 2012); KPMG, Basel 4 – Emerging from the Mist?,
KPMG: INSIGHTS (Sep. 4, 2013), https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2013/09/emergingfrom-the-mist.pdf; ANAD ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG
WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013); Ross P. Buckley, Rolf H. Weber & Mary DowellJones, A Swiss Finish for Australia? Approaches to Enhancing the Resilience of Systemically Important
Banks, 10(1) CAP. MKT. L.J. 41 (2015).
14 Stefan Ingves, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Governor, Sveriges Riksbank,
Keynote Speech at the Meeting for the Americas, Lima, Peru: Basel III Implementation: Progress, Pitfalls
and Prospects (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp141105.htm; see also BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL STANDARDS: A
REPORT TO G20 LEADERS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASEL III REGULATORY REFORMS (Nov. 2014),
12
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The Financial Stability Forum, precursor to the Financial Stability
Board, also adopted a resilience framework for its reform agenda, without
specifying how it defined resilience or what a resilient financial system
should look like. The schedule of measures that it proposed responded to the
particular failures identified during the crisis, rather than setting out a new
vision for the financial system. The stated goal was “to strengthen the
efficiency and resilience of the system, without hindering the processes of
market discipline and innovation that are essential to the financial system’s
contribution to economic growth.”15 Notwithstanding that recent
“innovation” had caused systemic meltdown, this implied that the system and
the ideas on which it was built were fundamentally sound, but that action was
needed on the specific failures that led to the crisis. This is an approach which
has been continued by its successor the Financial Stability Board. In his letter
to the G20 summit in Brisbane, Mark Carney, the Chair of the Financial
Stability Board, declared, “Strengthened international standards are building
more resilient financial institutions and more robust markets.” He noted that
the G20 had “worked intensively . . . to correct the fault lines that led to the
global financial crisis.”16
Another example of the postcrisis use of resilience in financial
regulatory debates is provided by a speech in 2011 by González-Páramo,
member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank.17 The speech
uses resilience or resilient twelve times, and yet fails to provide any
indication of what is meant by a resilient financial system. It is assumed that
this is an objective that requires no further explanation. González-Páramo
states “Why is the resilience of the financial system so important? The
financial system is the lifeblood of the real economy. It touches all facets of
our economy from households to corporations and even governments.” He
then focuses on the need for “a resilient risk management framework for the
future” resting on “the twin pillars of statistical risk models and stress
testing,” even though this is precisely the architecture of risk management

http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d299.pdf.
15 FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING MARKET
INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE, 2 (Apr. 2008), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
AND
r_0804.pdf?page_moved=1.
16 Letter from Mark Carney, Chair, Financial Stability Board, Governor, Bank of Eng., to G20
Leaders 1, 5 (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Chair’s-Letter-to-G20Leaders-on-Financial-Reforms-Completing-the-Job-and-Looking-Ahead.pdf; See also Building Resilient
Financial Institutions, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, www.financialstabilityboard.org/what-wedo/policy-development/building-resilience-of-financial-institutions.
17 José Manuel González-Páramo, Member, Executive Board of the European Central Bank, Speech
delivered at the 3rd Annual Risk and Return Russia Conference: Risk, Return, Resilience: The Future
Financial
System
(Apr.
14,
2011),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2011/html/
sp110414.en.html.
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which failed so spectacularly in the run up to and during the crisis.
Resilience, then, appears to be generally used as a broad descriptive
term for the goal of measures which regulators have decided upon, rather
than a new paradigm for financial stability from which to build. As one
commentator has noted, “current efforts to rebuild and reshape the financial
system fail to engage in depth the necessary preliminary questions about what
resilience might mean and who should be the subject of resilience-building
measures.”18 They are heavily, if not exclusively, focused on the resilience
of the financial system alone, as if that can be defined in isolation from the
way the financial system interacts with broader economic and socio-political
institutions. If financiers and regulators with decades of experience in the
international financial and monetary system cannot correctly identify market
resilience, and instead mistake precrisis symptoms for it, even as these are
reaching a critical stage, how useful is the concept as a broad policy tool?
Does the notion of resilience inject a new dynamic in the regulatory
endeavor, or is it merely a generic term for financial stability?
III. UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF RESILIENCE
As a starting point, it is increasingly recognized that the financial system
is a complex, nonlinear system19 like the social-ecological system, and is
therefore akin to a “financial ecosystem.”20 One of the key issues in defining
an agenda for a resilient financial system is to understand the nature,
structure, and key characteristics of the financial system. Given the scale,
complexity and rapid growth of financial markets, this is not self-evident, as
the system has fundamentally changed over the last two decades. During the
crisis it became apparent that regulators and financial institutions had simply
failed to understand the changes that had taken place in the financial system
over the years leading up to the crisis, and did not recognize transmission
mechanisms and interconnections between firms and markets and between
the financial system as a whole and the broader economy.21 Without a deep
18

Joanna Gray, Toward a More Resilient Financial System?, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 799, 802 (2013).
See, e.g., Andrew G. Haldane, Executive Director of Financial Stability, Bank of England, Speech
delivered at the Financial Student Association, Amsterdam: Rethinking the Financial Network (Apr. 28,
2009), http://www.bis.org/review/r090505e.pdf; John Kambhu, Scott Weidman & Neel Krishnan, New
Directions for Understanding Systemic Risk: A Report on a Conference Cosponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and the National Academy of Sciences, 13(2) NYFR ECON. POL. REV. 83
(2007).
20 See generally Andrew G. Haldane & Robert M. May, Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems, 469
NATURE 351 (2011); Robert M. May, Simon A. Levin & George Sugihara, Ecology for Bankers, 451
NATURE 893, 893–95 (2008).
21 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED
19
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understanding of the nature of the system and the way it evolves in relation
with other interlocking systems such as economic, political, social and
ecological systems, it is impossible to determine an agenda for building
financial resilience.22 Analyzing the dynamics of resilience in the socialecological domain and applying them within the context of financial markets
should enable the construction of an agenda for building resilience in
financial systems.
A. Resilience as a paradigm shift
Resilience theory emerged in ecology debates during the 1970s as an
attempt to analyze the capacity of ecological systems to resist disturbance in
the face of shocks.23 It drew on complex adaptive systems theory and secondorder quantum cybernetics to move thinking away from the model of
classical equilibrium that had until then predominated in scientific thinking.
The classic model had focused on the idea of a “balance of nature” or a
steady, stable state in ecology which did not accommodate the reality of
constant, dynamic, and random change within a system which permitted
adaptive responses to disturbance.24 The shift in thinking was largely a
response to scientific approaches to natural resource management that had
focused on quantitative metrics of producing the maximum yield from an
ecosystem, based on the idea of a simple, steady state equilibrium to which a
natural system would tend to revert after a shock. This approach had
downplayed and underestimated the importance of complex networks of
interdependencies within the system and was argued to be fundamentally
destabilizing to an ecosystem.25 The emphasis of this management approach
on stressing the ecosystem to produce the maximum yield weakened the
system by reducing the fundamental diversity which supports its capacity to
absorb shocks. Because this approach fundamentally misunderstood the
complex, adaptive nature of an ecosystem and the function of diversity, and
assumed linear, stable relationships between various aspects of the system, it
led to monocropping, overexploitation, and the loss of the diversity essential
STATES (2011).
22 May, Levin & Sugihara, supra note 20, at 894 (“[T]he dynamical implications of the topology of
financial networks emerge as good candidates for further research.”); see also Haldane & May, supra note
20.
23 See C. S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. OF ECOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 1 (1973), which was a seminal paper in this regard.
24 JOHN KIRCHNER, THE BALANCE OF NATURE: ECOLOGY’S ENDURING MYTH (2009).
25 Walker & Cooper, supra note 4, at 146 (“[T]he long-term expectation of stability may be inherently
destabilizing. When managed with the expectation of a permanent and fixed yield, the complex
interconnections supporting the resilience of the ecosystem as a whole may become undetectably fragile,
undermining its productivity.”).

9

DOWELL-JONES & BUCKLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

3/6/2017 6:19 PM

37:1 (2017)

to system survival.26
One example of the damage done by this approach is provided by
scientific forestry. To maximize the return on commercial forestry, a new
“science” of forest management emerged in Germany during the nineteenth
century. In place of the old, messy, mixed forests, German state planners
envisaged and planted uniform rows of single-species forests so as to produce
the maximum useable commercial timber harvest.27 Every aspect of the forest
was assessed to gauge its economic, utilitarian value, which led to many
subtle processes and flora being discounted as worthless.28 While the first
crop was a huge success which produced vastly more timber than the old
forests, returns declined steeply thereafter because the scientific plan to
simplify the forest and produce a maximum yield had failed to understand
the dynamic importance of the diversity of the old forest to systemic
resilience.29
A new word, Waldsterben (meaning “forest death”) even entered the
German language to describe the results of such forestry monocrops, which
starkly demonstrated “the dangers of dismembering an exceptionally
complex and poorly understood set of relations and processes in order to
isolate a single element of instrumental value.”30
This experience parallels the more recent one of credit derivatives and
the housing market and illustrates the relevance of ecological resilience ideas
for the financial ecosystem. In order to securitize thousands of home loans
into structured products, the complex dynamic of relationships, both
financial and personal, that comprise a housing market were reduced to a
simple concept of “credit risk.”31 This was itself simplified by using a proxy
26 Holling, supra note 23, at 21 (The very approach . . . that assures a stable maximum sustained yield
of a renewable resource might so change these deterministic conditions that the resilience is lost or reduced
so that a chance and rare event that previously could be absorbed can trigger a sudden dramatic change
and loss of structural integrity of the system.).
27 JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN
CONDITION HAVE FAILED 15 (1998).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 20 (“An exceptionally complex process involving soil building, nutrient uptake, and
symbiotic relations among fungi, insects, mammals, and flora – which were, and still are, not entirely
understood – was apparently disrupted, with serious consequences. Most of these consequences can be
traced to the radical simplicity of the scientific forest.”); see also Holling, supra note 23, at 11–22 for a
description of scientific forestry.
30 Holling, supra note 23, at 21.
31 Stan J. Liebowitz, Anatomy of a Train Wreck: Causes of the Mortgage Market Meltdown, in
HOUSING AMERICA: BUILDING OUT OF A CRISIS (B. Powell & R. Halcomb eds., 2009); see also David
Greenlaw et al., LEVERAGED LOSSES: LESSONS FROM THE MORTGAGE MARKET MELTDOWN,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE US MONETARY POLICY FORUM 2008, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO BOOTH
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, 2008; see SCOTT, supra note 27, at 103–46 for an analysis of the social complexity
of residential space; RICHARD SENNETT, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE EYE: THE DESIGN AND SOCIAL LIFE
OF CITIES (1990).
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(life insurance survivorship rates) to create a homogenized product:
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS).32 These could then be
widely commercialized so as to produce the maximum financial yield from
the underlying resource. Once the availability of RMBSs collided with
conducive conditions in the international financial markets, it led to financial
monocropping. In doing so, the complex, “scientific” mathematics of credit
risk modelling and credit derivatives massively oversimplified and
misunderstood the diverse range of relationships that drive a nation’s demand
for housing credit and the complex interdependencies that ensure its
resilience, by focusing on mortgage repayment probabilities and correlated
default rates, assessed through statistical abstractions and historical data. As
the head of asset-backed finance at Moody’s told a New York Times
interviewer: “We aren’t loan officers . . . our expertise is as statisticians on
an aggregate basis.”33 Finance became blind to the subtle network of systems
and social processes of which it was only one part and on which it depended.
Underlying the apparent success of credit derivatives and the risk
transference they enabled in the short run, processes were set in motion by
the application of this financial monocropping culture which restructured the
subtle dynamics of the system and ignored those aspects which were of no
commercial value, or difficult to program into their models. The range of
economic and social dependencies that typify a housing market, which are
largely locality specific, were then subsumed within broad-based
financialization.34 Although the initial result was a massive increase in
profitability for entities involved in structuring asset-backed securities, the
end result was the near collapse of the banking system. A process that
transformed mortgage finance — one of the oldest of banking products —
into a “scientific,” top-down mortgage system designed to enhance financial
returns nearly destroyed the entire financial system. Of course, the credit
crisis was driven by a multitude of factors,35 of which credit derivatives were
32 See generally David X. Li, On Default Correlation: A Copula Function Approach, 9(4) J. FIXED
INCOME 43 (2000) (showing that modelling the correlation of defaults in a mortgage market was one of
the key issues in managing the credit risk, that the author’s work on solving this problem led the way to
the massive growth in mortgage-backed securities, and that the failure of the models was central to the
credit crisis); see also Philippe Jorion & Gaiyan Zhang, Credit Contagion from Counterparty Risk, 64(5)
J. FIN. 2053 (2009) for an analysis of credit model fragility in estimated default correlations for specific
obligors.
33 Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/04/27/magazine/27Credit-t.html?ex=1366603200&en=aa00d5988f95645f&ei=5088&partner=
rssnyt&emc=rss; see also Phillipe Jorion, Risk Management Lessons from the Credit Crisis, 15(5) EUR.
FIN. MGMT. 923 (2009); Jón Daníelsson, Blame the Models, 4(4) J. FIN. STABILITY 321 (2008).
34 Craig Burnside, Martin Eichenbaum & Sergio Rebelo, Understanding Booms and Busts in
Housing Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16734, 2011).
35 Of the many factors that contributed to the subprime meltdown, one was a desire on the part of
U.S. policymakers to make housing finance more available to low-income borrowers, which led to banks
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only one, but in terms of the particular dynamics of the housing market and
ideas about ecological resilience, the immediate parallels with the
monocropping of ecosystems are striking.
The end result of the process was that banks had reduced their own
resilience by homogenizing their portfolios and loading up on a
commercialized, standardized product with seeming mathematical
justification, without regard to the basic health of the underlying ecosystem/
asset base.36 This was compounded by the narrow specialization of financial
roles and the segmentation of the credit process within financial institutions,
which removed the incentive for a system-wide perspective. The guiding
logic of securitization focused on maximizing efficiency and economic
output through risk transfer, without regard to possible entropy in the system
as risk was transferred through the layers of the securitization process.37 The
need to maintain the subtle socio-economic dynamics that supported
resilience was overlooked. As Andy Haldane has commented, “[F]inancial
sector balance sheets became homogenised. Finance became a monoculture.
In consequence, the financial system became, like plants, animals and the
ocean before it, less disease-resistant. When environmental factors changed
for the worse, the homogeneity of the financial eco-system increased
materially its probability of collapse.”38
This underlines the importance of understanding the complex nature of
the financial system and the interlocking nature of codependent systems
(financial-economic-social) as part of resilience thinking in finance. It also
suggests the importance of subtle, nonfinancial processes for building and
maintaining resilience—that a quest to isolate and maximize financial value
may fundamentally reduce systemic resilience by weakening the underlying
processes on which the financial system depends. The quest to maximize
financial yield cannot be pursued on the assumption that the processes it sets
in motion simultaneously maximize efficiency, human welfare, and systemic
resilience. This calls into question the Financial Stability Forum’s

seeking new ways of managing and profiting from the increased credit risk on their books.
36 This comes through very clearly in accounts of the crisis, as banks/investors relied entirely on
credit ratings and the outputs of risk models, without performing basic checks on the reality of the
underlying housing market. See, e.g., UBS, Shareholder Report on UBS’s Write-Downs, UBS ANNUAL
GENERAL MEETING 2008, 38–41 (Apr. 18, 2008), www.ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/
investor_relations/agm/previous-agms/2008/agm2008/invagenda.html.
37 Entropy is a central feature of ecological interdependencies: it refers to the rate of energy loss as
energy is passed through food webs and ecological systems. In contrast, theories of risk assumed that risk
could be dissected, disassembled, and reassembled along the chain of intermediation without any “energy
loss” or rate of dissipation. Entropy is an interesting idea to apply to finance and risk. See Kambhu,
Weidman & Krishnan, supra note 19, at 25; Rongzi Zhou, Ru Cai & Guanqun Tong, Applications of
Entropy in Finance: A Review, 15 ENTROPY 4909, 4909–31 (2013).
38 Haldane, supra note 19, at 19.
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juxtaposition of financial system resilience, efficiency, and innovation as
“essential to the financial system’s contribution to economic growth.”39 It
also calls into question the focus of the Financial Stability Board on “fixing
the fault lines that underlay the crisis” by addressing a range of narrowly
financial issues: bank capital, shadow banking, more transparent derivatives
markets, and ending too-big-to-fail (TBTF) through coherent resolution
mechanisms.40 This approach assumes the characteristics of the system that
plunged the world into severe crisis are fundamentally sound, and it suggests
creating a resilient financial system simply requires fixing the defects that led
directly to the crisis.
IV. IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS OF RESILIENT
SYSTEMS
A. Panarchy
In response to the problems of overexploitation of the natural
environment, ecological resilience thinking moved away from a focus on
classical equilibrium, to one of panarchy, or multiple equilibria through
which a system can transition. Panarchy has been defined as “[t]he interactive
dynamics of a nested set of adaptive cycles,”41 and it broadly refers to the
concept that a complex ecosystem has multiple potential points of
equilibrium, balanced across actors operating at multiple spatial and temporal
scales, and may never in fact be at a point of optimal equilibrium.42
A resilient ecosystem is one characterized by constant mutation at
different interlocking levels, from the fast change among microorganisms to
slower change at the level of regional ecosystems to the geological scale over
many millennia. All scales have the capacity to affect change at surrounding
levels, and attempts to manage for stability at one scale can have unintended
consequences at other scales. So for example, the attempt to manage forestry
for the life-cycle of trees affected the life-cycle of microorganisms which in
turn affected the slower process of gradual nutrient building in the soil which
supported successive populations of trees. Undermining these processes
altered the ability of the forest to regenerate and led to the failure of the
scientific approach to forestry. Similarly with credit derivatives, the financial
39

FIN. STABILITY FORUM, supra note 15, at 2.
Carney, supra note 16, at 3.
41 Carl Folke et al., Resilience Thinking: Integrating Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability,
15 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 4, 2010, at 1, 3; see also, PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS
IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 5 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
42 See Robert V. O’Neill, Recovery in Complex Ecosystems, 6 J. AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS STRESS &
RECOVERY 181, 184 (1999).
40
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system became deeply unstable because financial objectives and returns were
seen as an end in themselves. Little attention was paid to the broader impacts
on social and economic processes of the boom in mortgage finance as
financial profitability was taken as a proxy for increasing general welfare.
Applying panarchy thinking to finance makes it clear that the resilience of a
financial system cannot be viewed simply as the resilience of financial
institutions; it is a much broader concept which draws on the deep
interconnections across social, political, economic, and ecological systems.
Furthermore, the resilience of a financial system cannot be understood
without understanding how it interacts with systems at higher and lower
scales. For instance, the resilience of East Asia’s financial system cannot be
understood without an appreciation of its interactions with the global system
and vice versa, and any appreciation of the resilience of Indonesia’s financial
system requires an assessment of its interactions with both East Asia’s and
the global financial systems.
Resilience “embraces change as a requisite to persist,”43 and it is
different from the concept of robustness, which means the capacity of a
system with one broad point of equilibrium to resist crisis and return to that
point. In his 1973 paper, Holling differentiated between resilience and
stability:
[S]tability . . . represents the ability of a system to return to an
equilibrium after a temporary disturbance; the more rapidly it returns
and the less it fluctuates, the more stable it would be. But there is
another property, termed resilience, that is a measure of the
persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and
disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between
populations or state variables.44

Stability has come to be denoted as robustness and this is an important
differentiation in understanding resilience: robustness signifies “an ability to
withstand shocks to the system,” whereas resilience means an ability to
“adapt and reconfigure in response to them.”45 Robustness implies stability
is built into the system given assumptions about the magnitude of potential
shocks — as is currently the case with financial risk management. So a robust
system will be one designed to withstand a once in 100-year event for
example, an approach used in risk management. In contrast resilience makes
no assumptions about the magnitude of possible shocks, but rather looks to
43

Folke et al., supra note 41, at 1.
Holling, supra note 23, at 14.
45 Marc Welsh, Resilience and Responsibility: Governing Uncertainty in a Complex World, 180
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 15, 20 (2014).
44
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build systems that can deal with the entire range of shocks, and fail safely if
they must.
Robustness has a static quality, whereas resilience is more dynamic.46
Resilience is more open to the possibility of broad systemic change within
defined parameters—that a system will have different potential equilibria and
may cope with a shock by returning to a different equilibrium than before.
Indeed, resilience stresses the importance of this flexibility as essential to
system stability: it is this very capacity of the system to move from one point
of equilibrium to another that is essential to its resilience. Resilience is
therefore a view of a system as inherently heterogeneous and characterized
by response diversity which enables the system to cope with shocks: “the
stability of [social-ecological systems] is conceptualized as a moving
baseline made up of multiple states rather than a static pit in which systems
strive to remain.”47
In this sense, regulating for resilience implies the need for regulations
which maintain adaptive flexibility or adaptive governance. Applying such
resilience thinking is challenging, not least because it is not entirely clear
from regulatory documents which type of stability/robustness/resilience the
current postcrisis regulatory reforms are aimed at. Do they aim to protect and
underpin the status quo—on the basis that the current system is fit for purpose
save for key defects which led to the global financial crisis—or is there a
more fundamental agenda of reform that is necessary for global financial
stability? What would a state of multiple equilibria look like in finance, and
could regulation accommodate it? For example, it has been pointed out that
bank runs are entirely rational48 and that they represent the system flipping
from one equilibrium to another,49 and yet they are a classic example of the
type of undesirable panic/crisis event that policymakers seek to prevent and
that work on systemic stability attempts to prevent. Work is therefore needed
46 “Contrary to resilience, robustness does not include the ability to reorganize . . . and instead is seen
as a (static) system property.” Roland W. Scholz, Yann B. Blumer & Fridolin S. Brand, Risk,
Vulnerability, Robustness, and Resilience from a Decision-Theoretic Perspective, 15 J. RISK RES. 313,
319 (2012). The terms are sometimes used interchangeably. See, e.g., Kambhu, Weidman & Krishnan,
supra note 19 (using the term robustness to describe complex adaptive systems).
47 Muriel Cote & Andrea J. Nightingale, Resilience Thinking Meets Social Theory: Situating Social
Change in Socio-Ecological Systems (SES) Research, 36 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 475, 478
(2012).
48 As Mervyn King commented to Alistair Darling, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, during the
run on Northern Rock in 2007: “They’re behaving perfectly rationally, you know.” HUGH PYM, INSIDE
THE BANKING CRISIS: THE UNTOLD STORY 35 (2014).
49 The maturity transformation performed by banks creates multiple possible equilibria, and bank
runs have been characterized as “an undesirable equilibrium” which can result from the illiquidity of
assets and information asymmetries that characterize deposit-taking banking systems. Douglas W.
Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 24 Q. REV. FED. RES. BANK
MINNEAPOLIS 14, 15 (2000).
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to determine what a multiple-equilibria regulatory model would look like. It
would at least be helpful if regulators could clarify how they perceive
resilience in the postcrisis reform agenda. What, for example, does the
Financial Stability Board mean by stating that strengthened international
regulation is “building more resilient financial institutions and more robust
markets?”50
Resilience thinking moves away from the simple equilibrium of
classical economics and works instead from the premise of a system’s
adaptive capacity for overall stability through multi-scalar internal
instability, flexibility, and adaptability. Applying such thinking about
resilience to finance therefore raises pointed questions about the suite of
modern financial theories that underpin the markets, which have been
constructed on the premise of a single equilibrium system.51 These theories
broadly assume that economies and markets are stable and have a point of
equilibrium to which the system will naturally tend but are periodically and
only temporarily punctuated by disruption.52 This is typified by the Value at
Risk approach to risk management, based on the Gaussian bell curve
distribution of risk/returns which assumes that they are normally clustered
around the mean. Tail risk then becomes an outlier in an otherwise relatively
stable system.
Rather than viewing the challenge of systemic risk through the
assumption that markets efficiently and rationally price assets for financial
stability in the normal course of events—and are only intermittently
interrupted by cataclysmic crises which cannot be predicted from within the
market’s own frame of reference—resilience would appear to require a
cognitive approach that gives a central role to constant flux and
disequilibrium across the markets, “[f]or what is resilience but the notion of
disequilibrium as a general organising principle?”53
From this perspective, the focus of system governance—and the
management of episodes of disruption—should not necessarily be to return
50

Carney, supra note 16, at 1.
See, e.g., Robert C. Merton & Zyi Bodie, Design of Financial Systems: Towards a Synthesis of
Function and Structure, 3 J. INV. MGMT. 1, 1–23 (2005) (discussing institutional design of financial
architecture in light of frictionless neoclassical equilibrium and the rational behavior of agents); Olivier
Blanchard, Where Danger Lurks, 51 FIN. & DEV. 28, 28–31 (2014).
52 For an overview of how modern financial theory contributed directly to the crisis and
malfunctioning of the system, see, KEVIN DOWD & MARTIN O. HUTCHINSON, ALCHEMISTS OF LOSS: HOW
MODERN FINANCE AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION CRASHED THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2010). As
Haug & Taleb have commented: “theories about practice should arise from practice[] or at least avoid
conflict with it. This explains our concern with the ‘scientific’ notion that practice should fit theory.”
Espen Gaarder Haug & Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Option Traders Use (Very) Sophisticated Heuristics,
Never the Black-Scholes-Merton Formula, 77 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 97, 97 (2011).
53 Walker & Cooper, supra note 4, at 154.
51
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the system to the pre-existing point of equilibrium (if a point of financial
system equilibrium can indeed be identified) as is the case with current
regulatory thinking. Resilience thinking in ecology requires the acceptance
of notions of inherent instability and flux as the actions of agents continually
evolve to reshape the dynamics of the system. It requires governance around
dynamic flexibility because resilience depends on “diversity in norms,
institutions, laws, incentive structures and behavioural practices. Market
competition [in contrast] favors productivity but leads to diversity loss which
cripples the system’s ability to adapt to change.”54
B. Hysteresis
Another concept that is closely linked to the challenge of managing for
dynamic flexibility around panarchy, or multiple equilibria, is the notion of
hysteresis. Hysteresis in ecology refers to the energy changes within a system
as it moves between equilibria, which can have a decisive effect on its
recovery trajectory after shock. The recovery path of a system following a
change in state can be very different from the path it took during the change
in state because the energy required to return a system to its previous state
may be much greater than the energy required to bring about the original
change. Hysteresis means that as a system moves from point A to point B, it
loses energy or the energy dynamics change such that it may not
automatically shift back to point A: “[o]nce the system has shifted to a new
stable equilibrium, simply removing the stress will not automatically produce
recovery.”55
Linking to the notion of panarchy, hysteresis in complex adaptive
systems means that it cannot be assumed that the balance or particular
configuration of the system prior to a stress event is in fact its natural state to
which it will naturally return after a crisis, or to which the system should be
returned with targeted postcrisis management. Hysteresis and panarchy stress
the transient nature of systems:
The study of scale effects demonstrates with great clarity that nature
is dynamic, always changing at various scales of space and time.
Ecologists study what appear to be discrete ecosystems often giving
the appearance of being in equilibrium (i.e., “balanced”) but which
are, in reality, small segments of a temporal and spatial

54 Simon Levin et al., Social-Ecological Systems as Complex Adaptive Systems: Modeling and Policy
Implications, 18 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 111, 126 (2013).
55 O’Neill, supra note 42, at 185.
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continuum . . . .56

The point of managing a system for resilience, then, may not be to return
it to its original point of perceived balance but to accept that it may settle
elsewhere postcrisis. As such, “the resilience perspective shifts policies from
those that aspire to control change in systems assumed to be stable, to
managing the capacity of social-ecological systems to cope with, adapt to,
and shape change.”57
Applying this to financial governance and regulatory reform would
suggest a shift in conceptualizing the purpose of regulation beyond a focus
on restoring market equilibrium to the precrisis situation. In the case of a
bank run such as Northern Rock, for example, should the role of the regulator
be to intervene to save what can be salvaged of the bank? Or should it be
accepted that the system has shifted to a new equilibrium, and in doing so
has lost energy (the reputation of the bank’s brand) such that efforts to return
it to its former equilibrium as a functioning bank should not be pursued?
Similar questions can be asked about policies to support particular markets
and efforts to restore their functioning postcrisis.
C. Adaptive management around dynamic, interlocking systems
Managing for resilience requires a fundamentally different approach to
system governance than managing for stability around an assumed point of
equilibrium. It requires dynamic management which aims to maintain
flexibility in the system and scope for internal change—and to allow such
organic change—rather than seeking to limit change and maintain the status
quo on the basis that the underlying markets are efficient. It requires adaptive
rather than static management which accepts and allows postcrisis adaptation
in the system. Partly this stems from a need to accept the uncertain dynamic
of “interactions between slow-moving and fast-moving processes and
between processes that have large spatial reach and processes that are
relatively localized.”58 Managing for systemic stability around only one scale
or assumed point of equilibrium can have impacts on other interlocking
scales or processes, which can in turn destabilize the system and undermine
resilience. By managing for stability, resilience can be reduced: “[c]omplex
systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely
56

KIRCHNER, supra note 24, at 109–10.
Carl Folke, Resilience: The Emergence of a Perspective for Social-Ecological Systems Analyses,
16 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 253, 254 (2006) (citation omitted).
58 C. S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson & Donald Ludwig, In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change,
in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATION IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS (L. H.
Gunderson & C. S. Holling eds., 2002) 3, 9.
57
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fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks.”59
Yet to date, financial regulation has focused almost exclusively on
financial system stability by reducing volatility and strengthening the
viability of financial institutions using prescriptive metrics for risk weighting
of assets, capital adequacy, liquidity, etc. Key regulatory debates are framed
almost entirely from this vantage point, without taking into account (i) the
impact of financial system dynamics on other interlinked processes and
systems which can create unanticipated feedback loops for financial system
stability, or (ii) the unintended consequences of trying to manage for stability
in a complex adaptive system.
An example is the impact of the global asset bubble of 2005–2007 on
localized political structures, which in turn created new systemic
vulnerabilities. Management of the financial system in those years assumed
the success of financial innovation and new trading opportunities. From the
purely financial point of view from which financial stability work was then
focused, this was underpinned by the lack of market shocks during that period
and the rise in returns and profitability at financial institutions, both of which
were taken as signs of health in the financial system. However, the global
boom created severe economic stress across the world, raising the cost of
living, as the growing trading in commodity derivatives created a global food
crisis that triggered political unrest in several developing countries.60
A threshold effect of this process could be seen in the events of
December 2010 and after, when a Tunisian fruit seller immolated himself in
protest at repressive police treatment and the stress that rising costs and
disparities in growth were placing on his livelihood, sparking the first of the
Arab revolts.61 Yet the consequences were the destabilization of financial
markets globally. Multi-scalar effects are evident here: poverty, global
development, and political reform are generally slow-moving processes that
are managed separately from financial stability because they operate on a
different scale and are institutionalized in different forums.62 However, their
59 Nassim Nicholas Taleb & Mark Blyth, The Black Swan of Cairo: How Suppressing Volatility
Makes the World Less Predictable and More Dangerous, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 33, 33 (2011).
60 See Marco Lagi, Karla Z. Bertrand & Yaneer Bar-Yam, The Food Crisis and Political Instability
in North Africa and the Middle East, NEW ENGLAND COMPLEX SYS. INST. (2011),
http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_crises.pdf; Olivier De Schutter, Building Resilience: A Human
Rights Framework for World Food and Nutrition Security, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/23 (Sept. 8, 2008).
In April 2008 the United Nations created a High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis.
See High Level Task Force on Global Food and Nutrition Security, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.unfoodsecurity.org for details.
61 Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution: Causes and Impact, MEDITERRANEAN
Q., Fall 2012, at 23 (“The spark that ignited the uprising was not a cry for democracy but a demand for
jobs.”).
62 As Jeffrey Sachs noted, “we have trillions of dollars directed at banks and bail-outs but we’re told
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interdependencies create dynamic feedback loops that require integrative
management strategies around flexibility that take into account multi-scalar
effects and the possibility of transmission of vulnerabilities across different
scales and different interlocking systems. Arguably, network
interconnectivity such as this requires broader thinking around the real
meaning of financial stability. It is not enough to simply embed country risk
or political risk as a discrete category of the risk management framework so
as to manage financial loss on a particular transaction or define risk limits for
exposures.
Resilience in this sense is a challenge to the limits of current thinking
about the objectives of financial regulation, which focus purely on the
dynamics of the financial system itself and outcomes for system participants.
It fails to take into account the dynamics of symbiotically mutating systems
which are all nonlinear and nested, i.e. embedded in each other. Systemic
stability has been understood as an issue of business continuity at financial
institutions (particularly for systemically important financial institutions) and
stability across various financial markets. Drawing on resilience in socialecological systems science would indicate that to truly understand dynamic
resilience in finance, it cannot be framed from such a limited point of view,
particularly with globalized markets. Instead, it requires a perspective that
captures financial system dynamics in interaction with multiple other
dynamic systems: legal, political, ecological, cultural, institutional, etc.
These are all in turn complex adaptive systems evolving at their own rate.
Applying resilience thinking to finance therefore arguably requires a broad
theoretical expansion far beyond the current technical limits of the financial
stability debate to incorporate a more expansive cognitive map of the factors
that ultimately impact upon financial system stability. It raises broad public
policy questions around how we can or should define an optimal financial
system, and in particular whether the expansion of global financial markets
is an end in itself, even if it destabilizes other systems on which it ultimately
depends.
As persuasive as the idea of adaptive governance is, it is complex to
apply as a management tool in finance because an adaptive system can
inherently adapt to the properties of its own governance regime. The financial
system does already display properties of such adaptive behavior, which can
help pre-pave the conditions for the next crisis. Following the South East
Asian crisis of 1997–1998, for example, the countries involved began

there’s nothing for the poor. Meanwhile, we are teetering on the brink of collapse and violence in parts of
the world where people have been pushed to the brink.”Harvey Morris, Forgotten Victims of the Global
Downturn, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/79556b02-0db3-11de-8ea30000779fd2ac.
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stockpiling foreign currency reserves and keeping their currencies low
against the dollar to encourage exports. This was one factor that fueled global
liquidity and global imbalances that in turn contributed to the global credit
bubble.63 Although the South East Asian countries, as with many developing
countries, were able to weather the storm of the crisis reasonably well, the
currency imbalances helped stoke problems elsewhere, highlighting the
interdependencies at different ranges and scales that have come about
through integration of global markets. This raises the question: “Does the
resilience of some livelihoods result in the vulnerability of others?”64 How
should the system be managed to take into account these effects? If the
system is managed purely around the stability and profitability of financial
system participants, should the impact of financial flows on standards of
living and global livelihoods be a matter for financial system regulation, or
should it continue to be ancillary to regulatory mandates? Clearly, the way
we define system resilience is as important as the way we manage for it.
D. Resilience and “efficient” markets
Resilience and the notion of panarchy therefore offer a different
cognitive paradigm for systemic risk analysis and questions of market
stability than the current intellectual framework, and they raise pointed
questions about the ideas that have dominated financial theory over previous
decades: equilibrium, efficient markets, and the assumption of a normal
(Gaussian) probability distribution of returns in which the whole spectrum of
risks are calculable in a meaningful way.65 If markets are in constant flux and
features of the system are dynamically shifting in unpredictable ways, does
the theory that they efficiently price assets through the incorporation of all
relevant information at any given point actually fit, or do we need to conceive
of the system in radical new ways? Do pricing signals effectively convey the
information necessary for market participants to make decisions that promote
resilience? The fluidity of a complex adaptive and resilient system would
imply that financial markets may not be characterized by the stability of the
relationships between actors and risk factors that drive a market and that the
efficient market hypothesis requires.66 Instead, markets are conceived as
63 Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of
Common Causes, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.frbsf.org/economicresearch/files/Obstfeld_Rogoff.pdf.
64 Cote & Nightingale, supra note 47, at 482.
65 Esteban P. Caldentey & Matías Vernengo, Modern Finance, Methodology and the Global Crisis,
52 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 69, 69–81 (2010).
66 Economists “might say ‘get the prices right’ without recognizing that price systems require a stable
context where social and ecosystem processes behave ‘nicely’ in a mathematical sense (i.e., are continuous
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dynamically nonlinear in functioning:
Theories of complex systems portray systems not as deterministic,
predictable and mechanistic, but as process-dependent organic ones
with feedbacks among multiple scales that allow these systems to selforganize . . . . The study of complex adaptive systems attempts to
explain how complex structures and patterns of interaction can arise
from disorder through simple but powerful rules that guide change.67

If the markets are dynamically nonlinear and liable to flip from one
equilibrium to another in unexpected ways, a wholesale rethink of the
intellectual architecture of risk will arguably be necessary—from an
assumption of calculable uncertainty to an acceptance of incalculable
uncertainty.68 Nonlinearity, multiple equilibria and the dynamic uncertainty
of constant change challenge the utility of reliance on probability and a
normal distribution of returns as a baseline for risk management because it
implies that the system is constantly shifting and mutating—that it is not
amenable to a probability-type assessment. This raises the question whether
risks can be meaningfully assessed and managed in a constantly changing
system, or whether attempting to do this in a complex dynamic system pushes
risk into the statistical tails, creating “silent risks [that] accumulate beneath
the surface.”69 If risk cannot be meaningfully measured, this would call into
question the current architecture of risk weighted capital adequacy, which
requires a calculable distribution of risk which can be measured and hedged
across the spectrum of asset classes.
One major problem with the current regulatory approach to stability/
resilience in the financial markets, then, is that as it assumes inherent stability
in the distribution of returns it systematically downplays the likelihood of tail
risk events, which it cannot address from within its own framework.70 A
resilience approach to risk management that accepts the nature of finance as
a complex, nonlinear system would imply a need for a more dynamic model
that focuses on the constantly shifting, dynamic interplay of system

and convex) . . . without recognizing the surprises that nature and people inexorably and continuously
generate.” PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS, supra
note 41, at xxi–xxii.
67 Folke, supra note 57, at 257 (citation omitted).
68 Nina Boy, J. Peter Burgess & Anna Leander, The Global Governance of Security and Finance:
Introduction to the Special Issue, 42(2) SECURITY DIALOGUE 115, 115–122 (2011). This links into N. N.
Taleb’s thinking on risk and randomness in financial markets. See NASSIM N. TALEB, FOOLED BY
RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND IN THE MARKETS (2nd ed., 2005); NASSIM N.
TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007).
69 Taleb & Blyth, supra note 59, at 33.
70 Kevin Dowd et al., How Unlucky is 25-Sigma?, 34(4) J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 76, 76–80 (2008).
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participants and factors that are constantly shaping the potential outcomes of
the system in subtle ways. It would require a focus on the influence of
different scales and different interacting systems on risk. It is inadequate to
focus on market data as the primary vehicle for assessing risk, and outcomes
for system participants alone. Risk then moves from being a calculable
uncertainty to an incalculable uncertainty:
A new epistemic condition of deep or radical uncertainty has come to
dominate . . . because the increased interconnection and complexity of
‘traffic’ and communication – be it financial in the form of credit
channels, transport-based as in the aviation system, or biological as in
the spread of pandemics – vastly increases exposure to rare events that
exceed calculability and shatter existing provisions of crisis
management and insurance.71

Considering the dynamics of resilience within social-ecological systems
indicates the need for a radical shift in thinking about risk in finance. This
would need to move away from statistical modelling of market and economic
data on the assumption of a reasonably stable distribution of returns to a
framework that is more fluid, better able to aggregate risks across markets,
and better able to understand the interplay of risk across different interlocking
systems.
Although a rethinking of risk around a deeper understanding of
resilience is arguably essential, it is clearly problematic at the same time
because it would require fundamental changes to the current cognitive
architecture of risk. Recovery trajectories in complex systems are unique
because the system is always evolving, and “the complexity of the system
combined with unanticipated compounded effects can make recovery
trajectories difficult or impossible to predict. The system may look similar
but it is not the same system, because like any living system it is continuously
developing.”72 Given the realities of today’s markets, a more fluid, less
deterministic approach to risk management (whatever operational form that
may take) may be far more useful than the statistical assumption of normal
returns. The oversupply of global liquidity, the global hunt for yield by
investors, the prevailing narratives of financial analysts, the dynamics of risk
management and capital adequacy regulations, the existing monetary
policies, and the size of the financial economy relative to the real economy
are all factors internal to the financial markets that affect values, risks, and
financial stability and raise questions over the efficient pricing of capital by
market participants. As has been commented:
71
72

Boy et al., supra note 68, at 117.
Folke, supra note 57, at 257 (citation omitted).
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Capital superabundance will increase the frequency, intensity, size
and longevity of asset bubbles. The propensity for bubbles to form
will be magnified as yield-hungry investors race to pour capital into
assets that show the potential to generate superior returns. Because the
global financial system has grown so large relative to the underlying
economy, asset values can quickly reach unsustainable levels and
remain inflated for months or years.73

Developing a global risk architecture suited to this type of constant
change and incalculable uncertainty, as well as the influence of resilience
across multiple interlocking systems, must be part of a resilience agenda
which can provide a meaningful way of managing systemic change.
E. Heterogeneity: building resilience on diversity
A further factor that SES resilience thinking emphasizes is the essential
heterogeneity of system participants and behavior as a crucial component of
the capacity of systems to reorganize in the face of shocks.
The simplest intuitive case contrasts a competitive system in
homogeneous versus heterogenous space. . . . [H]omogeneity leads to
a single equilibrium in which the dominant population eliminates all
others. Heterogeneity, combined with limited dispersion, allows
multiple competitors to coexist, each within a local cell. The result is
that the total community, summed across the spatial heterogeneity,
can have a number of stable states, depending on the heterogeneity.74

This contrasts with the noted tendency of the international finance
architecture and financial theories to produce homogenized behavior of
system participants, even though the theories themselves fail to account for
the homogenizing tendency on participant behavior of their widespread
uptake.75 The standardization of global rules of financial regulation has also
been argued to reduce systemic diversity by mandating the harmonization of
procedures and management within financial institutions. As leading
commentators warned over a decade ago about the proposed Basel II
73 Karen Harris, Andrew Schwedel & Austin Kim, A World Awash in Money, BAIN & COMPANY:
INSIGHTS 4 (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/a-world-awash-in-money.aspx.
74 O’Neill, supra note 42, at 183 (citation omitted).
75 Homogenization has even been argued as strengthening the system: “When financial institutions
become more homogenous, the need for inter-institutional risk sharing is lowered. Any imperfections such
risk sharing may be subject to are hence mitigated. Moreover, institutions then need to rely less on such
risk sharing, which reduces externalities among them. This, in turn, improves their incentives and lessens
the need for regulating them.” Wolf Wagner, The Homogenization of the Financial System and Financial
Crises, 17 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 330 (2008).
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regulations: “Of special concern is how the proposed regulations would
induce the harmonisation of investment decisions during crises with the
consequence of destabilising rather than stabilising the global financial
system.”76
The homogenization of participant behavior is also exacerbated by the
use of similar benchmarks for performance, and similar analytical and
valuation techniques drawn from the same financial theories and narratives
of market trends. As a result, financial behavior becomes highly correlated
under stress, leading to one-way markets in response to shocks that
destabilize financial structures and serve as a conduit for the transmission of
problems from one market sector to another.77 Rather than the market
mechanism serving to contain the forces of crisis by bringing heterogeneous
buyers and sellers together, the standardization of practice through
harmonized rules, theories, and benchmarks reinforces a crisis and
exacerbates its global impact.
The drive to standardize the regulation and governance of the system
around what is perceived to be best practice and cutting edge financial theory,
therefore, may lead to diminished systemic resilience. Efforts to build greater
resilience must focus on fostering heterogeneity such that “competitive
advantage shifts among species and never remains constant long enough to
permit dominance or elimination.”78 Heterogeneity being essential to
systemic resilience raises questions over the current approach of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, which is pursuing a Regulatory
Consistency Assessment Programme. This is based on the assumption that
“[c]onsistent implementation of the Basel framework is fundamental in
raising the resilience of the global banking system.”79 Yet the standardized
international capital adequacy framework and risk models were identified
during the crisis as having failed to build adequate reserves into the system.80
How consistent implementation of the new framework will deliver resilience
is not articulated, beyond the fact it will maintain “market confidence in
regulatory ratios” and provide “a level playing field for internationally

76 JON DANIELSSON ET AL., AN ACADEMIC RESPONSE TO BASEL II: SPECIAL PAPER NO. 130 3 (2001),
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ca/fmg.pdf.
77 Charles Goodhart & Wolf Wagner, Regulators Should Encourage More Diversity in the Financial
System, VOX (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.voxeu.org/article/regulators-should-encourage-morediversity-financial-system; MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION: GENEVA REPORT ON THE WORLD ECONOMY NO. 11 (2009).
78 O’Neill, supra note 42, at 183.
79 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REGULATORY CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT
PROGRAMME (RCAP) – ANALYSIS OF RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS FOR MARKET RISK 5 (2013).
80 See, e.g., JAMES ALEXANDER ET AL., VERDICT ON THE CRASH: CAUSES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
(Philip Booth ed., 2009).
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operating banks.”81
The need for heterogeneity also raises the question of whether a system
can be truly resilient when it is dominated by a cadre of TBTF financial
institutions that benefit from substantial public guarantees that ensure their
survival, despite the negative externalities they generate pursuing their own
private gains. Arguably, this is inimical to systemic resilience: in multiple
equilibria ecological systems “[l]ocal conditions change so rapidly that
competitive advantage shifts among species and never remains constant long
enough to permit dominance or elimination.”82 After the crisis, improving
competition among the banking industry has been a theme of public policy
debates, yet with the efforts to underpin banking giants in many countries
and the special global regulation of systemically important financial
institutions, the effects on competition are questionable.83
TBTF financial institutions are justified on the basis of economies of
scale. However, much recent research has questioned whether economies of
scale in banking diminish beyond a certain size, and are offset by the
management and governance problems created by greater institutional
complexity and lack of transparency of risks.84 Furthermore, the global
negative externalities TBTF banks generated during the crisis raise questions
over whether further embedding the dominance of TBTF financial
institutions through creating a targeted regulatory regime assists or
undermines resilience. Given the strain on public sector balance sheets in the
advanced economies, if the regulatory measures targeted at TBTF financial
institutions fail, there is little scope for further public bailouts. Such
institutions, therefore, pose critical ongoing risks to the health of the
international financial system. It may well be that a thorough understanding
of resilience in financial systems will establish that no system can be truly
resilient if it contains institutions that are TBTF.
One regulatory approach that could enhance systemic resilience is the
81

BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 79.
O’Neill, supra note 42, at 183.
83 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS:
UPDATED ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE HIGHER LOSS ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT (2013).
Twenty-nine banks have currently been identified as systemically important banks. FIN. STABILITY BD.,
2013 UPDATE OF GROUP OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (2013),
http://www.fsb.org/2013/11/r_131111/.
84 Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. of Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Speech delivered at the Institute of
Economic
Affairs,
London:
On
Being
the
Right
Size
(Oct.
25,
2012),
http://www.bis.org/review/r121030d.pdf; Robert DeYoung, Scale Economies Are a Distraction, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS: THE REGION 14–16 (Sept. 2010); Arnoud W.A. Boot, Banking at the
Crossroads: How to Deal With Marketability and Complexity, 1 REV. DEV. FIN. 167, 167–83 (2011);
RONALD W. ANDERSON & KARIN JOEVEER, BANKERS AND BANK INVESTORS: RECONSIDERING THE
ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN BANKING: DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 712 (2012), http://www.lse.ac.uk/
fmg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/fmgdps/dp712.pdf.
82
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work to develop an effective and credible resolution regime for TBTF
financial institutions—living wills.85 Living wills are designed to respond to
the particular dominance of these institutions by building a process of
bankruptcy or restructuring that will allow the institutions to be wound up in
an orderly way without requiring public funds or destabilizing the markets.
The fact that such companies require living wills indicates how far from
resilient the system actually is, but if living wills can be successfully
implemented, they will surely enhance the resilience of the financial system
by expanding the capacity of markets for self-renewal in the face of shocks.86
Living wills depend upon effectively anticipating the types of stress
events that may occur and how they would impact an organization. If done
well, stress testing will enhance financial institution resilience in the SES
sense because it builds dynamic responsiveness to changing conditions into
the heart of the organization. It can also build a capacity in the organization
to anticipate and reconfigure in the face of market shocks, particularly if used
effectively in terms of capital budgeting and risk appetite planning. However,
translating a resolution procedure from theory to practice is far from easy
given the complexity and opacity of these organizations. The next major
crisis may teach us that living wills, while fine on paper, do little to limit
contagion and corral systemic risk in an actual crisis.
One segment of the financial markets that has displayed resilience in the
ecological sense in recent years is the hedge fund industry.87 The collapse of
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 is often used to illustrate
the dangers of hedge funds. However, in practice, the dynamics of the sector
are very different from that of the global banking industry: there is a very
high attrition rate among funds that largely passes unnoticed, does not cause
systemic ripples, and does not require taxpayer-funded bailouts. Even LTCM
was bailed out by private sector financial institutions at the instigation of the
Federal Reserve, rather than by an injection of public funds.88 According to
85 Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, FIN. STABILITY BD.
http://www.fsb.org/2014/10/r_141015/, (Oct. 15, 2014); Directive 2014/59/EU, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution
of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, 2014 O.J. (L 173); IMF, Cross-Border Bank Resolution:
Recent Developments, Board Paper (June 2014).
86 Such living wills are difficult to translate from theory into workable plans given the scale and
complexity of TBTF institutions and the cross-border issues involved. See Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Statement: Credibility of the 2013 Living Wills Submitted by First
Wave Filers (Aug. 5, 2014); Emilios Avgouleas, Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, Bank Resolution
Plans as a Catalyst for Global Financial Reform, 9 J. FIN. STABILITY 210, 210–18 (2013); IMF, The TooImportant-to-Fail Conundrum: Impossible to Ignore and Difficult to Resolve, Staff Discussion Note (May
27, 2011).
87 Hedge funds are alternative investment funds that invest using bespoke, proprietary investment
strategies to try to generate higher returns than those produced by standard asset managers.
88 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM
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a recent report, in the five years prior to 2014, half of all hedge funds were
found to have closed, and the average life of a hedge fund that survived its
first year of operation was just over five years.89 The UK’s Financial Conduct
Authority has commented: “Hedge funds fail or close down on a regular basis
without causing a significant impact on the financial system, but [the few]
very large hedge funds potentially pose a risk.”90 It is noteworthy that the
sector displays very different characteristics from the global banking
industry. Hedge fund assets under management are roughly USD two
trillion.91 In comparison, the top five largest banks in the world have over
USD thirteen trillion in assets.92 The hedge fund industry is also characterized
by many small funds, with nearly ninety percent of funds managing less than
USD 500 million in assets.93 The sector operates on much higher leverage
than the banking industry—average leverage was estimated at 130% in 2012,
down from 150% in 2010—but is characterized by regular fund liquidations
which do not impact market stability.94 As part of a resilience research
agenda, further investigation of the relative dynamics of the banking and
hedge fund sectors may prove fruitful.
Such a study may shed light on the role of regulation in shaping market
dynamics, for the latest crisis at least has been centered on highly regulated
financial institutions.95 The failures of regulation and supervision have come
in for heavy criticism following the crisis, and the postcrisis regulatory
response has also been criticized as not going far enough. The response has
been characterized as being insufficient to have prevented the latest crisis, let
alone the next one.96 The dynamics of the regulatory and supervisory process
as in itself a complex, adaptive system may need to be examined in light of
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS
(1999), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/documents/hedgfund.pdf; Franklin R.
Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, 13(2) J. ECON. PERSP. 189,
189–201 (1999).
89 Dan McCrum, Zombie hordes thrive, await further hedge fund corpses, FT ALPHAVILLE (Mar. 25,
2014, 10:14 AM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/03/25/1810462/zombie-hordes-thrive-await-furtherhedge-fund-corpses/ (citing data from Hedge Fund Research).
90 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., HEDGE FUND SURVEY: MARCH 2014 4 (2014).
91 THECITYUK, HEDGE FUNDS REPORT 2013, 1 (2013).
92 Maria Tor & Saad Sarfraz, Largest 100 Banks in the World, SNL (Dec. 23, 2013),
https://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/Article.aspx?cdid=A-26316576-11566.
93 THECITYUK, supra note 91, at 5 chart 13.
94 Id. at 6.
95 Of course, credit default swaps were unregulated products that were part and parcel of the failures
at large financial institutions like AIG, Citigroup, etc.
96 Douglas W. Arner, Adaptation and Resilience in Global Financial Regulation, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1579, 1579–1628 (2011); Alex. J. Pollock, Lots of Regulatory Expansion but Little Reform, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (June 22, 2010), https://www.aei.org/publication/lots-of-regulatory-expansionbut-little-reform/; Ross P. Buckley, The G20’s Performance in Global Financial Regulation, 37(1)
UNSW L.J. 63, 63–93 (2014).
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a resilience research agenda, and the limits of what regulation may be able to
achieve honestly assessed. As had been pointed out about the process of
drafting the Basel framework: such international regulation is produced by a
“highly politicized committee process[,] . . . [which is] the product of
innumerable arbitrary decisions, irrational compromises, and political horsetrades – not to mention the personalities and prejudices of the main
participants involved.”97
Adaptive governance of the complex adaptive financial system through
the medium of a legal framework also therefore needs to take into account
the complex, adaptive nature of the law: “The legal system comprises a
multitude of institutions and actors interacting and evolving over time in
ways that give rise to complex system dynamics. . . . [P]utting panarchy
theory into practice will require adaptively managing the complex adaptive
legal system to adaptively manage other complex adaptive natural and social
systems.”98
F. Integrative resilience
Analyzing resilience in finance therefore requires an agenda for
defining systemic resilience at the outset, as well as an agenda for how
characteristics of resilience can be fostered through legal and governance
processes. This is a very tall order. At the level of the law, for example,
financial regulation interacts with a range of other legal provisions such as
property rights, contract law, corporate law, and international investment
law, as well as with the political, institutional, and power structures of a given
country. It also suffers from the fact that the organizational bureaucracies put
in place to implement financial regulation can themselves become rigid and
resistant to change over time, and subject to their own particular dynamics.
The behavior of agents in various interacting processes and systems is
then another essential component affecting the dynamics of the system and
its ability to cope with shocks. Ecology theory quickly realized that the
resilience of an ecological system could only be meaningfully understood
and defined through reference to the interplay of ecological and human/social
systems. The influence of human agency on an environment is so great that
the ecology cannot be analyzed in isolation. Both systems were symbiotically
undergoing dynamic changes, and resilience therefore embodies the notion
of constant change of symbiotically mutating systems that nonetheless
generate stability. The resilience of one system therefore draws upon the
97 K. DOWD & M. HUTCHINSON, ALCHEMISTS OF LOSS: HOW MODERN FINANCE AND GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION CRASHED THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 290 (2010).
98 J. B. Ruhl, Panarchy and the Law, 17(3) ECOLOGY SOC’Y 31, 32 (2012).
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resilience of other systems with which it is nested or interdependent. Could
this mean that resilience in finance requires a far greater capacity to capture
and respond to feedbacks from social, economic, political, and institutional
dynamics than is currently the case? Such dynamics express the tapestry of
power-relations in different societies and how this can affect financial system
functioning. Due to the fragmentation of institutional, legal, and disciplinary
boundaries, they are currently largely isolated from each other as areas for
policy debate. Analyses of financial sector governance will typically ignore
issues of political organizational development, local poverty and economic
inequality, and ethical issues, but once resilience is defined from a broader
frame of reference than simply the business continuity of financial
institutions, they all become part of an agenda for resilience, particularly in
a globalized world.
A further relevant question, then, is the scale of observation from which
we observe resilience of the financial sector. Is it purely a question of
business continuity and viability under stress of financial market participants
as regulation is currently drafted? Or in this globalized world is it also a
question of the impact of dynamic financial processes on a whole range of
other systems—ecological, political, and social, for example—which in turn
shape the resilience and continuity of financial markets? Expanding inquiry
to this scale to take into account interlocking dynamics of various systems
will invariably raise normative questions of the functions of finance and the
impact of its dynamics on local processes. If trading commodity derivatives
generates profits for firms in New York, London, and Switzerland, but
impacts livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa which in turn affects the resilience
of their social and political structures, is this a question for the resilience of
the financial architecture? If markets aren’t efficient allocators of capital,
then what is their purpose and what should the resilience agenda aim to
protect? Ultimately, a fundamental question that needs to be asked at the
outset is: resilience of what and for whom?
V. AN AGENDA FOR FINANCIAL RESILIENCE
Although this paper has merely skimmed the surface of what is a
complex and ever-expanding debate in order to highlight some themes, we
can now contrast eight different characteristics of a resilient system as
defined in ecology with features of the modern financial system. The
characteristics of a resilient system in a SES sense are:
• Capacity to reorganize and persist in response to shocks,
• Panarchy,
• Hysteresis,
• Adaptive governance and management processes,
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•

Dynamic interplay of resilience at different temporal and spatial
scales,
• Interlocking, nested complex adaptive systems,
• Incalculable dynamic uncertainty, and
• Heterogeneity.
In contrast, the features that characterize the current approach to
conceptualizing and regulating the financial system are:
• Robustness/stability,
• Frictionless equilibrium,
• Static governance around a perceived single equilibrium,
• Isolation of financial system stability as the single purpose of
regulation,
• Financial system stability assessed from the perspective of
market dynamics, with impacts of the financial system on other
systems largely ignored,
• A calculable distribution of risk, only intermittently disrupted
by tail risk events, and
• Homogenization of system participants fostered by regulation,
benchmarking and herding, heightening correlation in times of
stress.
These lists indicate a need to rethink our understanding of the nature of
the financial system and its resilience, including what is meant by resilience
in finance. Applying the notion of resilience as it has come to be understood
in social-ecological systems science raises some fundamental questions
about the prevailing architecture of financial theory, of financial regulation,
of the management and governance of the system, as well as normative
questions about the purpose of the financial markets and their impacts on
other systems. A broader systems perspective on the interaction of finance
with other interdependent systems raises the question whether we need in
fact to rethink its boundaries as part of a study of the nature of financial
resilience. If global financial markets are causing acute stress in the cost of
living and destabilizing political regimes that in turn impact financial
markets, should this be part of a broader debate on financial resilience even
if it does not immediately impact the viability of financial institutions? How
wide do we cast the net of resilience? The deepening of global financial
markets has resulted in the growing interdependence of systems and an everexpanding influence of financial markets on other features of daily life. These
can in turn symbiotically influence the performance of financial markets and
cannot be excluded from a resilience framework.
Once we have defined resilience, how then do we manage for it? The
postcrisis regulatory architecture builds largely on the pre-existing
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architecture rather than on radical rethinking.99 It aims to bolster the stability
of key hubs of the system such as systemically important banks and insurers,
or through central clearing for over-the-counter derivatives, or otherwise by
addressing specific issues that were critical to the last crisis. This in no way
guarantees systemic resilience going forward as the epidemiology of each
crisis is unique, and this approach may, in the long run, exacerbate
fragility.100
It has become clear in ecology that designing a management system
around a particular web of ecosystem diversity implies effectively imposing
value judgements on the system as to which characteristics we wish to protect
and help endure. The choice of management methodology in itself then
affects the dynamics of the system. In application to finance, this raises
theoretical questions around what we are managing resilience for, which
strays into normative territory. Currently, the regulatory debate assumes that
the current “efficient” financial system is the optimal one only if we can fix
the failings that led to the last crisis—and hence we have an incremental
approach to postcrisis regulation. But this approach is effectively loaded with
a qualitative judgement on what functions the financial system is meant to
serve and which features are optimal from a particular worldview. When
deconstructed in light of alternative equilibrium states of the system, this is
fraught with value judgements that only take into account a limited range of
socio-economic impacts, and which prioritize maintaining the status quo for
financial entities as the optimal outcome of a regulatory regime. A broader
analysis of resilience dynamics requires that this normative judgement be
placed at the forefront of redesigning an architecture of financial resilience.
VI. CONCLUSION
Resilience is a fashionable concept that is currently being applied in a
variety of disciplines, and which has frequently been used in debates on
financial regulatory reform since the crisis. Current use of the term resilience
in regulatory pronouncements appears to be based on an assumption that
resilience is another word for financial stability, and that postcrisis changes
which improve the current framework to address the specific failings that led
to the latest crisis are sufficient to build resilient financial markets. However,
resilience is a much deeper and more complex concept than this, and work
in social-ecological systems science has identified key features of resilience
99 Ross. P. Buckley, The Changing Nature of Banking and Why It Matters, in RECONCEPTUALISING
GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION (R. P. Buckley, E. Avgouleas & D. Arner eds., 2016).
100 Folke et al., supra note 41, at 4 (“there is a danger in becoming too focused on specified resilience
because increasing resilience of particular parts of a system to specific disturbances may cause the system
to lose resilience in other ways.”).
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in complex adaptive systems that allow systems to persist and renew in the
face of disturbance. Applying those features to the characteristics of the
contemporary financial system and the regulatory agenda indicates that there
is a need for a much more comprehensive debate on what we mean by a
resilient financial system, and who or what should be resilient.
Most often today, when financial regulatory agencies speak of
resilience, they mean robustness, and it is not clear that anyone really knows
what a truly resilient global financial system would look like. It is usually
taken as a given today that the objective of regulation is the viability and
business continuity of financial entities, but this presupposes key aspects of
resilience which do not necessarily hold true in complex, dynamic, nonlinear
systems. Building resilience in the global financial architecture may require
a broader perspective that builds upon notions of multiple equilibria,
incalculable uncertainty, the dynamic heterogeneity of system participants,
and the importance of the interaction of resilience in multiple interacting
systems for the resilience of the financial system. Drawing on resilience as it
is defined in ecology would therefore require a cognitive shift in perceptions
of resilience in the financial markets towards a more dynamic, multivariate
concept of the system which in turn calls for a re-envisioning of the system
and its governance.
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